We Wants Socialism

 

THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST STRUGGLE AND SAMYAVADA

Address at the Indian Political Conference, London, to June 1933

 

We had been engaged in a non-violent war with the British Government for the attainment of our political freedom. But today our condition is analogous to that of an army that has suddenly surrendered uncondi­tionally to the enemy in the midst of a protracted and strenuous campaign. And the surrender has taken place, not because the nation demanded it - not be­cause the national army rose in revolt against its lead­ers and refused to fight - not because the supply of the sinews of war was cut off - but either because the Commander-in-Chief was exhausted as a result of re­peated fasting or because his mind and judgment were clouded owing to subjective causes which it is impos­sible for an outsider to understand.

 

What would have happened-I ask-if a similar in­cident had taken place in any other country? What happened to all the Governments that surrendered to the enemy at the end of the Great War? But India is a strange land.

 

The surrender of 1933 reminds one of the Bardoli Retreat of 1922. But in 1922, some explanation, howev­er unsatisfactory, could be offered to justify the retreat.

 

The outbreak of violence at Chauri Chaura was sug­gested as the pretext for suspending the Civil Disobe­dience campaign in 1922. What explanation or pretext can one suggest to account for the surrender of 1933 ?

 

There can be no doubt that the non-cooperation movement that was launched in 1920 and has been in existence in some form or other since that date - was the movement best suited to India in the fateful year 1920. There can be no doubt that in 1920 when political India was looking forward to a more militant plan of action - Mahatma Gandhi was the one man who could stand up as the undisputed spokesman of the people and lead them on from victory to victory. And there can also be no doubt that during the last decade India has completed the march of a century. But stand­ing today at the crossroads of Indian History - it is meet and proper that we should try to discover the mistakes of the past - so that our future activity may be directed along the right lines and all possible pitfalls may be avoided.

 

For the attainment of freedom two paths are open to us. One is the path of uncompromising militancy. The other is the path of compromise. If we follow the first path, the fight for liberty will have to be pursued till we are able to wrest political power in its entirety and there lan be no question of a compromise along the road at freedom. If, on the other hand we follow the second path, periodical compromises may have to be made with Our opponents for consolidating our po­sition, before further attempts are made.

 

At the outset it should strike everybody that it is not at all clear if our movement during the last thirteen years has been following the path of uncompromising militancy or that of compromise. This ideological ambiguity has been responsible for a lot of mischief. If our policy had been one of uncompromising militancy, the Bardoli surrender of 1922 would never have taken place - nor would the Delhi Pact of March, 1931, have been entered into. On the other hand, if we had been following the pa th of compromise, we should never have missed the opportunity of a bargain with the British Government in December 1931 - when the sit­uation was so opportune. In March, 1931, the situation was not opportune for a compromise from our point of view ~ nevertheless a truce was. established between the Indian National Congress and the British Govern­ment. And considering our strength in March, 1931 ­the terms of the truce were altogether unsatisfactory. In short, as political fighters we have .. been neither suffi­ciently militant - nor sufficiently diplomatic.

 

In a fight between an unarmed subject people like the Indians and a first-class imperialist power like Great Britain - the supply of our necessary resources depends on our ability to keep up the enthusiasm of the people and maintain the spirit of opposition to­wards the Government. In the case of a war between two well-equipped and well-trained armies, the psy­chological factor is not so important as in bur case. In 1922, when the whole nation had been roused to pas­sionate activity and greater daring and sacrifice could be expected of the people, the Commander-in-Chief suddenly hoisted the white flag. And this happened after he had thrown away, a couple of months. earlier, a unique opportunity for what would have appeared in the existing circumstances as an honorable com­promise with the Bureaucracy.

 

It is not easy to learn to remember the lessons of past history and the latest developments in India go to show that we have not yet assimilated the lessons of 1921 and 1922. And unfortunately for us, with the death of Deshbandhu C.R. Das and Pandit Motilal Nehru of hallowed memory in 1925 and 1931 respectively - there disappeared from the Indian scene two political giants who might have saved India from the political mess in which she now finds herself.

 

In December 1927, when the Indian National Con­gress met at Madras, the unanimous acceptance of the resolution on Independence gave an indication of the rising temper of our people. And when early in 1928 the Simon Commission landed at Bombay, the demonstra­tions throughout India were reminiscent of the glorious days of 1921. From one point of view, the situation in 1928 was more favourable than in' 1921 - because while in 1921 the Indian Liberals we're actively opposed to the Congress - in 1928· they were actively opposed to the British Government and in the campaign against the Simon Commission there was a united front of the Congress and the Liberal Party. The arriv~1 of the Simon commission should therefore have been the occasion for reviving the movement which had been suspended arbitrarily by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922. Nevertheless, for full two years, instead of marching ahead we began to retreat. In December, 1928, a resolution was passed at the Calcutta Congress by approximately 1,300 votes to 900, which put back the clock by definitely commit­ting the Congress to the acceptance of Dominion Status. Thus at Calcutta we retreated not only from the position at Madras in December, 1927 - but also from the position at Nagpur in December, 1920 -:- because the Nagpur resolution on Swaraj, in view of its vague ter­minology, could be interpreted to mean that the goal of ' the Indian people was to be 'Independence' and not 'Dominion Status'.

 

The 'resolution of the Calcutta Congress gave the British Government one year's time within which they could offer Dominion Status to India. But the Govern­ment had no intention of making any such offer to India. The situation therefore became rather critical for the Congress leaders when the year 1929 began to draw to a close without Dominion Status being in sight. Another gesture was made by the Congress lead­ers in November, 1929, on the eve of the Lahore Con­gress, but to no avail. In a joint manifesto - now gen­erally known as the Delhi Manifesto - the leaders agreed to participate in the Round Table Conference in London if some assurance would be given that Domin­ion Status would be granted to India.

 

I was one of those who had the temerity to oppose Mahatma Gandhi's resolution on Dominion Status at the Calcutta Congress in 1928 and who had the pre­sumption to condemn the Delhi Manifesto of Novem­ber 1929. We had to point out that the Round Table Conference was a misnomer because it was not a Con­ference of plenipotentiaries representing the belliger­ent parties. A large number of nondescript Indians nominated by the alien Government would be present at the Conference to do the bidding of the wily British politicians. Moreover, if the Conference by any chance arrived at any conclusions favourable to India - they would not be binding on the British Government. We also pointed out that the primary object of the Govern­ment in convening this Conference was to bring the Indians to England and make them fight amongst themselves for the amusement of the British people. We therefore urged that as the Sinn Feiners had boy­cotted the Irish Convention, which was Mr. Lloyd George's creation, so also the Indian National Congress should leave the Round Table Conference severely alone.

 

But ours was a cry in the wilderness. The leaders as a body were too anxious to find some honorable es­cape from the impending fight with the Government which was every day becoming unavoidable. But no such opportunity was given by the Government. Con­sequently when the Lahore Congress met in December, 1929, the temper of the people had risen and there was no alternative for the leaders but to swallow the reso­lution on Independence.

 

But 'Independence', which implied severance of the British connection - was like a pill bitter to the taste and difficult to digest. When the Congress unanimous­ly adopted the resolution on Independence and there­by once for all ended the shilly-shallying of the last nine years - the moderate elements in the country were alarmed. Our leaders lost no time in trying to reassure them and beautiful phrases and attractive slo­gans were evolved for the purpose. We were told that Independence meant 'Purna Swaraj' (an expression which one could interpret according to his conve­nience). Mahatma Gandhi issued early in 1930 his fa­mous 'eleven points' which, according to him, repre­sented the substance of Independence and could form the basis of a compromise with the British Govern­ment. Thus the significance and the effect of the Lahore Congress resolution on Independence was nullified to a great extent through the action of the leaders them­selves.

 

After the Lahore Congress it was impossible for the leaders not to do anything. The movement was there­fore launched with the celebration of the Independence Day on the 26th January, 1930. By April the whole of India was in the throes of a revolution (may be a non­violent revolution). So great was the response of the people to the can to action that even Mahatma Gandhi was taken by suprise and he stated that the movement could have been started two years earlier.

 

The movement of 1930 -like the earlier movement of 1921 - took the Government by surprise and for a long time they were at a loss to decide as to the most effective means for crushing the movement. The inter­national situation - economic and political - also helped India. It was therefore a mistake to suspend operations on the basis of what is known as the Delhi Pact (the Gandhi-Irwin Pact) of March, 1931. Even if the leaders wanted a compromise, they should have waited for a more opportune moment, and such a moment would certainly have arrived if the operations had continued for another six months or one year. But once again subjectivism prevailed - and objective factors and considerations were not taken into account when the Delhi Pact was entered into. I shall even go so far as to say that in the circumstances which prevailed in March, 1931 - better terms could have been extracted from the Government if our leaders had possessed greater statesmanship and diplomacy.

 

As matters stood, the Delhi Pact was an advantage to the Government and a disaster to the people. The Government got time to study the tactics adopted by the Congress organization in 1930 and 1931, so that they could perfect their machinery for striking a crush­ing blow whenever the Congress launched the move­ment once again. It is now a matter of common lan­guage that the ordinances promulgated by the Govern­ment in January, 1932, and the detailed tactics adopted

 

by them throughout the year, were carefully worked out before the year 1931 came to a· close. But what did the Congress do? Inspite of the fact that there was seething discontent in the Frontier. Province, in the United Provinces 'and Bengal, 'nothing was done by the leaders ~o prepare the country for the unavoidable re­sumption of the fight. In fact, I .shall not be wrong if I say that till the last everything was done to avoid 'a possible resumption of hostilities.

 

The Delhi Pact had on the whole a soporific effect on the popular enthusiasm and passion - neverthe­less, the temper of the people was too militant to be soothed by soft phrases. And if this had not been the case, I am sure that a resumption of hostilities would have been successfully avoided by the leaders. It is necessary for the workers 6f tomorrow to realise that the movement of 1932 was not planned and organised by the leaders, as it should have been, but that they were dragged into it. And if this statement be true, should it surprise anybody if the leaders today feel anxious to get out of the troubles into which they were forced in January, 1932?

 

The Delhi Pact of March, 1931, will appear to be a painful document the more we study it:

 

(1) In the first place there,was not one word of commitment on the part of the British Govern­ment on the major issue of Swaraj.

 

(2) In the second place there was a tacit accep­tance of the proposal of federation with the Indian Princes - a' proposal which, in' my humble opinion, is disastrous to the political progress of the country.

 

(3) Thirdly, there was no provision for the release of the incarcerated Garhwali soldiers - the finest apostles of non-violence - who refused to shoot down their unarmed countrymen.

 

  (4) Fourthly, there was no provision for the re­lease of the state-prisoners and detenues who were   imprisoned without any trial, charge or justification.

 

(5) Fifthly, there was no provision for the with­drawal of the Meerut Conspiracy Case which had been dragging on for years.

 

(6) Sixthly, there was no provision for the release of other classes of political prisoners, not convicted for participation in the Civil Disobedi­ence Movement.

 

  It will thus be seen that the Delhi Pact, by refusing to espouse the cause of the Garhwali soldiers, the state prisoners, the Meerut Conspiracy prisoners and the revolutionary prisoners, deprived the Indian National Congress of the claim to be the central organ of the anti-imperialist struggle in India. By declining to be the spokesman of these militant anti-imperialist elements in India, the Indian National Congress stood out before the Indian public as the spokesman and representative of the 'Satyagrahies' (Civil resisters) alone.

 

If the Delhi Pact of March, 1931, was a blunder, the surrender of May, 1933, is a calamity of the first mag­nitude. According to the principles of political strategy, at a time when the new constitution for India is under discussion, the maximum pressure should have been brought to bear on the Government by a strengthening of the Civil Disobedience Movement in the country. By suspending the movement at this critical hour, the work, the suffering and the sacrifice of the nation for the last thirteen years have been virtually undone. And the tragedy of the situation is that the people who could have effectively protested against this gross be­trayal are now safely lodged behind prison bars. As to those who are outside prison, a real protest has not probably been possible because of the 21 days fast of Mahatma Gandhi.

 

But the die has been cast. Suspension of the Civil disobedience campaign for one month means virtually a permanent suspension - because mass movements cannot be created overnight: So the problem now be­fore us is what we should do to make the most of a bad situation and what policy and plan we should adopt for the future.

 

Before we can solve this problem, two other ques­tions will have to be answered by us :

(1) With regard to our goal, is a compromise be­tween England and India ultimately possible?

 

(2) With regard to our method, can India win political freedom by following the path of periodical compromise and without adopting an uncompromisingly militant plkan of ac­tion?

 

To the first question I say that such a compromise is not possible. A political compromise is possible only when there is some community of interest. But in the case of England and India there are no common inter­ests which can make a compromise between the two nations possible and desirable, as we shall see from the following :-

 

  (1) There is no social kinship between the two countries.

  (2) There is hardly anything in common between the cultures of India and of Britain.

 

(3) From the economic standpoint, India is to Brit­ain is a supplier of raw materials and a con-   sumer of British manufactures. On the other hand, India aspires to be a manufacturing country, so that she could become self-contained in the matter of manufactured goods and could also export not only raw materials but manufactured goods as well.

 

(4) India is at present one of the biggest markets for Great Britain. The industrial progress of India therefore is against Britain's economic interests.

 

(5) India affords employment at present to young Britishers in the army and in the civil admin­istration in India. But this is against India's interests and India wants her own children to occupy all these posts.

 

(6) India is sufficiently strong and has enough re­sources to be able to stand on her own leg without the help or patronage of Great Britain. In this respect the position of India is quite different from that of the dominions.

 

(7) India has so long been exploited and dominat­ed by Britain that there is a genuine apprehension that in the event of a political compro­mise between the two countries, India will stand to lose and Britain will stand to gain. Moreover, India has developed an 'inferiority complex' as a result of her long servitude, and this 'inferiority complex' will remain as long as India is not completely independent of Brit­ain.

 

(8) India wants the status of a free country, with her own flag, her own army, navy and de­fence     force, and with her own ambassadors' in the capitals of free countries. Without this in-' vigorating and life-giving freedom, Indians will never be able to rise to the full stature of their manhood. Independence is to India a psychological, ethical, cultural, economic and political necessity. It is an essential condition of the new awakening in India. Independence, which India aspires after today, is not 'Domin­ion Home Rule/ as we find in Canada or Australia, but full national sovereignty as ob­tains in the United States of America or in France.

 

 (9) As long as India remains within the British Empire she will not be able to safegurard the interests of other Indians who have settled in other parts of the Empire. The weight of Great Britain has always been, and always will be thrown on the side of white races - as against the Indians. An independent India, on the oth­er hand, will be able to secure better treatment for her children who have settled in different parts o! the British Empire.

 

       It will thus be seen that the basis of a compromise between India and Great Britain does not exist. Conse­quently, if the leaders of the Indian people disregard this fundamental fact and effect a compromise with the British Government, the arrangement ~ill not last. Like the 'Gandhi-Irwin Pact' of March, 1931, it will be short­lived. The social, economic and political forces work­ing within India are such that no peace is possible between India and Britain till her legitimate aspirations are fulfilled.

 

         The only solution of the present deadlock that is possible is through the attainment of India's freedom. This implies the defeat of the British Government in India. How India can win freedom for herself, we shall now have to consider.

 

       With regard to the second question - namely, the question of the method we should adopt - I may say that the country has already rejected the path of peri­odical compromise. The support which the country gave to the Indian National Congress was due to the fact that the Congress promised to win Independence for India and promised to fight on and on till this was accomplished. Therefore, in determining our future policy and plan, we should rule out, once for all, the prospect of periodical compromises.

 

The Congress hoped to win political freedom for India by paralyzing the Civil administration of the country through non-cooperation and Civil Disobedi­ence. It is necessary now to analyze the causes of our failure in doing so in order that we may be more suc­cessful in the future.

 

The position of the British Government in India to­day in relation to the Indian National Congress can be compared to a well-armed and well-equipped fortress standing in the midst of territory which has suddenly become hostile. Now, however, well-equipped a for­tress may be it requires for its safe existence for all time a friendly civil population living around and near it. But even if the surrounding population become hostile, the fortress has nothing to fear in the immediate future, so long as the people round about it do not make an active attempt to seize the fortress. The objective of the Indian National Congress is to get possession of the fortress now occupied by the British Government. To­wards this end the Congress has succeeded in winning over the sympathy and support of the population living round about and near the fortress. This is the first stage of the campaign from the Indian side. For the next stage of the campaign, either or both of the following steps can be taken:

 

(1) A complete economic blockade of the fortress, which will starve into submission the army occupying the fortress.

 

(2) An attempt to capture the fortress by force of arms.

 

In the history of war both these methods have been tried with success. In the last great war Germany was the victor from a military point of view, but she was starved into submission through the economic block­ade of the Allies. This blockade was possible because the Allies had control over the seas and over the lines of communication leading into Germany.

 

In India no attempt has been made to storm the enemy's citadel by force of arms, as the Congress pol­icy has been pledged to non-violence. The economic blockade, though attempted in a general way by the Congress, has failed for three reasons :

 

(a) All the external communications leading to India are controlled by the Government.

 

       (b) Owing to defective organization inside India the lines of communication from the seaports to the interior and from one part of the coun­try to another are not controlled by the Con­gress, but by the Government.

 

       (c) The machinery for collecting revenue - on which depends the existence of the British Government in India - has not been seriously impaired. There have been deficits in most provinces, no doubt, but the Government have been able to makeup either by increased taxation or by borrowing.

 

       It should always be remembered that a nationalist movement can succeed in paralyzing a foreign Govern­ment only when either or all of the following steps are taken:

         (1)Prevention of tax and revenue collection.

 

        (2) Adoption of measures whereby help from oth­er quarters - whether financial or military - may      not reach the Government in times of distress.

   

            (3) Winning over the sympathy and support over the present supporters of the British      Government in India – that is, of the Army, the Police and civil servants- so that orders given by the Government for crushing the movement will not  be carried out.

     

 (4) Actual attempt to seize power by force of arms.

 

     

   The last step has to be ruled out, because the Con­gress is pledged to non-violence. But it is  nevertheless possible to paralyse the present administration' and compel it to submit to our demands it we can adopt the following measures :-

 

(1) Prevent collection of tax and revenue.

 

    (2) Through labor and peasant organizations prevent all kinds of help from reaching the Government when they are in difficulty

   

       (3) Win the sympathy and support of the Govern­ment's own supporters by means of our supe­rior propaganda.

 

If these three measures are adopted, the Govern­mental machinery can be thrown out of gear. In the first place, they will have no money to meet the cost of administration. In the second place, the orders they may issue will not be carried out by their own officers. And, lastly, help sent to the Government from other quarters will not reach them.

 

There is no royal road to success in winning polit­ical freedom. The above three measures have to be adopted in part or in whole if victory is to be achieved. The Congress has failed, simply because it has not suc­ceeded in giving effect satisfactorily to any of the above three measures. The peaceful meetings, proces­sions and demonstrations that have been held during the last few years, in spite of the official ban, show a spirit of defiance no doubt and also cause some annoy­ance to the Government; but they do not yet menace the very existence of the Government. In spite of all our demonstrations and in spite of seventy thousand persons having gone to prison since January, 1932, the Government can still claim:

 

(1) That their army is quite loyal.

 

(2) That their police forces are quite loyal.

 

(3) That the Civil administration (collection of reve­nue and taxes, administration of law courts and of prisons, etc.) is still unimpaired.

 

(4) That the life and property of Government offi­cials and of their supporters are still quite safe.

 

And the Government can still boast that they do not care if the general population in India today are passively hostile. As long as the people do not actively menace the Government and their supporters, either with arms or through an effective economic blockade, the present Government can continue to exist for an indefinite period, in spite of our non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience.

 

During the last decade there has been an unprecedented awakening all over India. The placid self-com­placence of the people· is gone. The whole country is throbbing with new life and is yearning for freedom. Fear of official frowns, of imprisonment and of baton charges has disappeared. The prestige of the British has reached its lowest ebb. There is no question of goodwill on the Indian side towards the British Gov­ernment. The moral basis of British rule has been de­molished, and it rests today on the naked sword and on nothing else. And India has managed to capture the imagination of the world.

 

But the fad has to be faced that 'free India' is still a thing of the future! The intentions of the British Gov­ernment with regard to Indian aspirations as embodied in the recently published White Paper show clearly that they are not yet prepared to part with an iota of real power. Apparently the British Government think that they are strong enough to resist successfully the demand of the Indian people. And if they are strong enough to resist us, it dearly shows that the most strenuous efforts of the Indian people since 1920 have failed to bring us appreciably nearer our goal of 'Swaraj'.

 

India therefore must resolve to launch another fight on a bigger and more intensive scale. The intellectual and practical preparation for this must be scientific and must rest on objective foundations. The intellectual preparation for this task will entail the following mea­sures :-

 

(i) A scientific examination of the strong and weak points of British Rule in India in relation to the Indian people.

(ii) A scientific examination of the strong and weak points of the Indian people in relation to British rule in India.

(iii) A scientific examination of the rise and fall of empires in other